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STA TEI1ENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff, Gustave E. Bush, filed an action to quiet title to 
real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, basing his claim upon 
a forged deed. Subsequently plaintiff was granted Summary Judgment 
against the Defendants, which judgment quieted title in the Plaintiff. 
The Respondent as a Third Party Plaintiff filed an action against 
the Appellant, with the Respondent as the insured. This action was 
based upon the premise that if the Plaintiff was successful in quieting 
title against the Defendants, then this defect was covered by the title 
insurance policies issued by the Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a trial without a jury the court entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment in favor of the Respondent, 
The Lockhart Co. 
RELEASE SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent asks that the Judgment entered by the District 
Court be affirmed, and that the Respondent be awarded costs and attor-
ney's fees incurred in connection with this Appeal. 
STA TEI-IG\T OF FACTS 
In the early part of June, 1975, the Respondent, the Lockhart Co., 
made loans to the Defendants, llickey 1·1. Coult and Patricia Ann Coult, 
(hereinafter referred to as "Coults ") and to the Defendants, l·lerrill 
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\~ilson Harward and Vera f-1ae Harward, (hereinafter referred to as 
( "Harwards "). The Caul ts executed a Promissory Note in the amount of 
$25,118.00 and the Harwards executed a Note in the amount of $25,117.00. 
As security for these Notes, Coults and Harwards executed Trust Deeds 
and conveyed to The Lockhart Co. as Trustee, certain real property lo-
cated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
On or about the 24th day of 14ay, 1975, the Appellant, Commonwealth 
Land Title Insurance Company, issued to The Lockhart Co. as the insured, 
a Commitment for Title Insurance insuring the title to the properties 
conveyed by the Defendants, Coults and Harwards. (Ex. P-5) Common-
wealth thereafter on each piece of property issued separate title insur-
ance policies. Both policies were in the amount of $25,117.00. (Ex. 
P-6, P-7) 
On November 13, 1975, the Respondent was served with a Summons and 
Complaint filed by the plaintiff, Gustave E. Bush. t1r. Bush claimed 
ownership in Fee Simple to the property which The Lockhart Co. had taken 
as security for the money loaned to Caul ts and Han,ards. The Respondent 
thereafter tendered defense of the lawsuit by f·1r. Bush to the Appellant 
on December 10, 1975. (Ex. P-8) By letter dated January 16, 1976, the 
Appellant declined to undertake the defense of this action on behalf of 
The Lockhart Co. (Ex. P-9) 
1·1r. Bush thereafter obtained a Summary Judgment in his favor against 
the Defendants, Coults and Harwards and against the Respondent, The Lock-
hart Co., wherein it was determined that ltr. Bush did have fee simple own-
ership to the properties which had been given by the Coul ts 0nd Han1ards 
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to The Lockhart Co. as security for the monies loaned. In his Affidavit 
filed with his 1·1otion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Bush stated that he had 
examined the proported conveyances from himself to the Defendants, Mickey 
t~. Coult and Patricia Ann Coult, and that the signature thereon of one 
Gustave E. Bush was not made by him personally or by anyone else with 
his knowledge or under his authority or under his direction. Because 
of this forgery there exists a defect in the titles of said property 
and the Appellant by virtue of its title policies insured The Lockhart 
Co. against this defect. 
The Respondent obtained judgment against the Defendants, Coults and 
Han~ards and has released its liens against the properties. Its claim in 
this lawsuit is only against the Appellant and judgment was entered in favor 
of the Respondent, The Lockhart Co. , against the Appellant. The Respondent 
made the loans to Coults and Harwards after obtaining the title policies 
from Appellant. The Respondent's employee, Gary Lyons, did not order the 
insurance commitment. It was ordered by t~ickey Coult after Appellant had 
already agreed to insure the property long before Lockhart ~1as ever in the 
picture (T. 495, 532, 554-555). Gary Lyons, did not knoH Jerome Yeck's 
reputation; in fact, there is no evidence linking Jerome Yeck to the defect 
involved in this lawsuit. 
ARGUI1ENT 
HIE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE Tf\IAL COURT'S FINDI"JGS Or FACT 
All of the facts set forth in Appellant's brief were considered 
b) the Trial Court. The Trial Court entered its findings of fact based 
upon all the evidence and the Trial Court's findings should be sustained. 
-3-
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The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the findings of the trial 
court should be sustained unless evidence clearly preponduates against 
them. Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 
(1972); Stucki v. Stucki, 562 P.2d 240 (Utah 1977). The record supports 
the trial court's conclusion that the Respondent had no knowledge of any 
defect or other matter which would preclude Respondent from recovering 
its losses under the title insurance policies issued by the Appellant. 
In making its Findings of Fact, the trial Court took judicial no-
tice of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment entered by 
the Third District Court in favor of the Plaintiff, Gustave E. Bush, 
wherein it was held that Bush is the owner in fee simple of the property 
in which Respondent had a lien, and that Bush never executed any deed or 
document conveying any interest to any of the defendants, and that the 
purported conveyance from himself to Coults does not contain the signa-
ture of Gustave E. Bush. (R. 219). The Trial Court also found that 
Respondent had no knowledge of this defect or any other defect, lien, 
encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter affecting title to the pro-
perty which would preclude recovery by the Respondent against the Appel-
lant. (R.219,220). 
Focusing in on the issue asserted by the Appellant, that Respondent 
was told of a deed to a Deseret Distributing Co., and that Respondent 
assumed that Jerome Yeck may have an interest in the property, there 
is no evidence whatsoever linking Jerome Yeck or Deseret Distributing 
to a forged deed. There is no evidence whatsoever that f:espofldent kne1·1 
or even had reason to know of Yeck's reputation with the title insurance 
companies. There is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent suffered 1ts 
-4-
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losses as a result of any claim by Yeck or Deseret Distributing, or as 
a result of a forgery by Jerome Yeck. Yet, Appellant is relying totally 
on the fact that Respondent was told of a deed to Deseret Distributing 
and that Respondent assumed that Yeck may have had an interest in the. 
property. This is the "credible" evidence which Appellant argues, re-
quires this Court to reverse the Trial Court's findings. All of the 
testimony elicited by Appellant as to Jerome Yeck is not material absent 
a showing that (1) Yeck's involvement affected title to the property and 
(2) Respondent had actual knowledge that Yeck's involvement affected 
title to the property. \1ithout this evidence the trial court found 
Appellant liable to Respondent under its title insurance policies. 
An examination of the title insurance policies is also important. 
(Ex. P-6 & P-7). These policies are identical in form and language. 
The Appellant relies on paragraph 3 of its "Exclusions from Coverage." 
This "Exclusions" section cannot be read, hm~ever., in context of this 
laY~sui t, without reading the section entitled "Mortgagee's Title Insur-
ance Policy" directly above the Exclusion section. This section is 
"subject to the Exclusion from Coverage," and specifies what "loss or 
damage" is covered. If the insured suffers loss as a result of any of 
the causes specified, and there is no exclusion as to that cause then 
the title company is liable for the insured's loss. 
The judgment quieting title in Mr. Bush established the defect and 
as a result of that defect, the Respondent suffered loss, i.e., it lost 
its interest in the property. Respondent suffered no loss or damage as 
a result of a deed to Deseret Distributing or as a result of Hr. Jerome 
leek. The few facts known by Respondent, which Appellant is claiming 
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I 
come within the exclusions, do not even give rise to a claim by Respond-' 
ent under the policy. There is no question but that Respondent would 
not be entitled to claim damage as a result of a lien which was not the 
cause of Respondent's loss. 
A contract of title insurance is an agreement to indemnify those 
who actually suffer loss through a defect in title, and is not a contract 
of guaranty, and in order to recover thereon an insured must establish a 
loss resulting from the defect, and until a loss occurs, there is no 
liability. Sattler v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 162 A.2d 22 
(Pa., t?Co ). Respondent is not contending that Appellant is liable 
to Respondent based on the fact that there was an unrecorded deed to 
Deseret Distributlng or that Jerome Yeck may have claimed an interest in 
the property, because Respondent suffered no loss as a result. Any know-
ledge thereof is immaterial in this lawsuit. What is material is that 
there ~;as a defect, a fact not disputed by Appellant, and that Respondent 
suffered loss as a result of that defect and had no knowledge of the 
defect, again facts not disputed by Appellant. 
\'!hat Appellant is saying is that Respondent cannot collect on the 
defect which caused the loss because it knew of facts totally unrelated 
to the loss. Appellant is relying for this argument on langua~e in the 
policy to the effect that Respondent knew of facts, which if known to 
Aopellant, would have precluded issuance of the policies. Simply, the 
policies do not say what Appellant is contending they say. Appellant 
contends that because Respondent did not give Appellant written notice 
of Jerome Yeck, Deseret Distributing Coc::pany or the rejection of title 
-6-
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insurance by \·/estern States Title that Respondent is precluded from re-
covering on a loss which had no connection with Jerome Yeck, Deseret 
Distributing or the rejection by ~/estern States Title. The exclusion 
language cannot be interpreted as suggested by Appellant. Such an inter-
pretation would a11o~l a title company to deny any claim on the basis 
that "other matters" unrelated to the loss had not been disclosed in 
writing. 
It is the widely accepted rule that title insurance policies should 
be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer. 
Hall by Goodell v. San Jose Abstract & Title Insurance Co., 172 Cal 2d 421, 
342 P.2d 362 (J), H. Trisdale Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co., 146 Cal 
2d 831, 304 P.2d 832 f9~' ); Overholtzer v. Northern Counties Title 
Insurance Co., 116 Cal 2d 113, 253 P.Zd 116 ( 19~J ). An earlier 
California case involving language construction of a title policy said: 
The courts have also announced a **** to the effect 
that when the language employed in an insurance con-
tract is ambiguous, or when a doubt arises in respect 
to the application, exceptions to, or limitations of 
liability thereunder, they should be interpreted most 
favorably to the insured. **** Where the language and 
terms of a policy are framed and formulated by the 
insurer, every ambiguity and uncertainty therein 
should be resolved in favor of the insured. Coast 
l·lutual Building Loan Ass' n v. Security Title TrlSUrance 
S Guaranty Co., 57 P.2d 1392 (Cal. 1936). 
In oarticular, ·~revisions relating to exclusions or exceptions 
from the performance of the insured's obligations are construed strictly 
against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured." Paramount 
Properties v. Transamerica Title Co., 463 P.2d 746, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 
(1970). It is evident that the above cited rule of construction used 
in t 1 tle insurance cases was derived from its general insurance counter-
-7-
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part. The rule on the level of general insurance has been expressly 
adopted in Utah by the Courts' statements that insurance policies should 
be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the 
insurer. Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 13 Utah 2d 303, 373 
P.2d 580 (1962); Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Co., 107 Utah 478, 
155 P.2d 173 ( ,qq~ ). 
The Respondent respectfully submits that the policies in question 
(ex. P-6 and P-7) and the commitment (Ex. P-5) are not subject to the 
construction given them by Appellant. The trial court so found, and 
these findings should not be disturbed. The Appellant has failed to 
sho~1 that these findings are not supported by the evidence. Appellant 
is attempting 1n its brief, as it did at trial, to make something out 
of nothing. At trial, Appellant's theory was to show Gary Lyons as the 
"architect" of a scheme to defraud and conceal facts from the Appellant. 
Contrary to this theory, the evidence is clear and convincing that there 
1'as no such scheme. To advance this theme on appeal, Appellant has mis-
stated facts and testimony. For example, on P. 6 of Appellant's brief, 
Appellant infers that Gary Lyons suggested that the defendants get a 
policy fr-om some other- titlE company. On the contrnry, both llr. Coult 
and llr. Lyons testified that l·lr. Coult suggested another title company 
(Tr: 495; 532, 554). In fact, l·lr. Coult testified that Appellant had al-
ready issued a commitment on this property before Respondent was ever 
involved, and that he suggested that it be used. (m 532. 554). llr. 
Coult contacted Appellant and had Respondent named as insured. (TR. 555) 
Also on P. 17 Appellant misstates the testimony given by Del ~owl~)· In 
-8-
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summarizing 1·1r. Rowley's testimony, Appellant says: "That he (Lyons) 
had told the loan applicants that if they could get another company to 
write the title insurance, the loan could be made ••• " The actual 
testimony of ~1r. Rowley says: " ..• so they asked him (Lyons) if he got 
title insurance through another company if he could still make the 
loan ••. " (TR 461) (emphasis added). This testimony is consistent with 
that of Lyons and Coult. The Respondent was not attempting to mislead 
Appellant. There is no evidence Mr. Lyons knew of Jerome Yeck's reputa-
tion. There was nothing to hide. 
The foregoing facts are not really material to the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence, but Respondent feels they should be cor-
rectly stated so as not to mislead this Court. These statements are 
important, however, to shm~ that there was no concealment or misrepresent-
ation on the part of the Respondent. The evidence supports the court's 
findings on this point. 
Furthermore, Appellant's reliance upon Utah Code Ann. §31-19-8 
(163), and the numerous insurance cases cited in its brief, is misplaced. 
This statute and all the cases cited only have application to insurance 
policies requiring a written application as evidenced by the entire 
chapter 19 in the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. §31-19-5, 6 & 7 (1953). 
Title insurance contracts differ from insurance contracts in this re-
gord. There is no application in title insurance, of the nature required 
by Section 31-19-7 and the representations mentioned in §31-19-8 are 
representations on a 11ri tten application. Title insurance contracts 
are warranties and the insurer actually determines the state of the title. 
-9-
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This is made clear in Research Loan & Invest. Corp. v. Lawyers Title 
Ins. Corp. 225 F. Supp. 287 (~I.D.t~o. 1964) Rev at 361 F.2d 764 (1966), 
which cites Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Truste Co., 
225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E.468 (1918), one of the leading cases on title in-
surance in the country, which examined the purpose and object of a title 
insurance policy. The court noted 
" ••• to a layman a [title} search is a mystery, and the 
various pitfalls that may beset his title are dreaded, 
but unknown." 
It [Empire] then held that: 
"To avoid a possible claim against him, to obviate the 
need and expense of.professional advice, and the un-
certainty that sometimes results even after it has 
been obtained, is the very purpose for which the owner 
seeks insurance." 
That case [Empire] continued: 
"A title policy is much in the nature of a covenant of 
warranty or a covenant against encumbrances. (emphasis 
added) 225F.Supp at 289, 290. 
The Eighth Circuit Court. of Appeals, in reversing the District court, did 
not disturb these concepts of title insurance. Rather, the circuit court 
reinforced them: 
"This appeal raises serious questions concerning the 
fundamental nature of title insurance .•. Usually, the 
very purpose and essence of the title insurance trans-
action is to obtain a professional title search, 
opinion and guarantee. The policy of title insurance 
is in the nature of a rmrranty." 361 F.2d at 767 
(emphasis added). 
The law does not impose any duty upon an applicant for title insurance to 
do the work of the title insurance company. Id at 290. The very purpose 
Respondent required title insurance was to protect it against the type of 
loss it suffered as a result of a forged deed. There simply is no evidence 
that Respondent concealed or misrepresented facts which it knew would in-
fluence the risk of issuing the title policies in question. If Respondent 
-10-
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kne1·1, and policy requires "actual knowledge," that the deed was forged 
and failed to notify Appellant in writing, the Appellant's Exclusion 
section would be applicable. But to say Respondent knew facts which are 
in no way related to the loss, is a gross restructure of the conditions 
of the policy. Even the Statute (Utah Code Ann. §31-19-8) quoted by 
Appellant on p.21-22 of its brief requires that'concealed or misrepre-
sented facts be related to the "hazard resulting in the loss." 
In every life and fire insurance case cited by Appellant, the con-
cealed or misrepresented fact was related to the hazard resulting in the 
loss. If, for example, an applicant for life insurance concealed a heart 
condtion, but died of cancer, the insurer could not deny coverage, because 
the fact concealed did not cause the loss. This is exactly the farfetched 
concept Appellant is asking this court to accept. The trial court rejected 
this contention, and the evidence supports the trial court's findings that 
Respondent had no knowledge of the defect which caused the loss (forgery) 
or which would preclude recovery by the Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent asks this court to affirm the lm~er court and to award 
Respondent its costs and attorneys fees on this appeal. The evidence relied 
upon b> Appellant \'las considered by the trial court. The Appellant failed 
to meet its burden of proving that Respondent had actual knowledge of the 
alleged defect on any other matter which resulted in Respondent's loss. 
RESPECTFULLY SUrniiTTED, 
(}JDJ~ 
-11-
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Suite 80 l<ennecott Building 
Salt La City, Utah 04133 
Att neys for Respondent 
l1AILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief have been 
mailed to: 
BRANT H. \'!ALL 
Suite 500 Judge Building 
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